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Summary: Telecommunications is a key element of the ICT sector which has been shaped 
by strong innovation dynamics since the 1990s. Market dynamics in OECD 
telecommunications markets are analyzed. We present new ideas about efficient regulation, 
emphasizing the need to adopt a broader international perspective. Analytical innovations 
also include the discussion of an adequately-modified Hitch-Sweezy oligopoly model. 
Moreover, we suggest differentiated two-part tariffs as an ideal welfare-maximizing 
approach in both wholesale and end-product markets. From a theoretical point-of-view, the 
need to avoid regulatory uncertainty is also emphasized. Theoretical progress is contrasted 
with regulations in the EU and the US. The EU offers a broad range of different regulatory 
approaches where the link between framework regulation and national regulation is rather 
complex. The internationalization of telecommunications requires a broader cooperation 
among regulators in the OECD. 
 
 
Zusammenfassung: Telekommunikation ist ein Schlüsselelement des IKT-Sektors der seit 
den 90er Jahren durch hohe Innovationsdynamik geprägt war. Die Marktdynamik in 
ausgewählten OECD Telekommunikationsmärkten wird untersucht. Neue Überlegungen 
zu einer effizienten Regulierung werden präsentiert, wobei die Notwendigkeit zu einer 
breiteren internationalen Perspektive betont wird. Analytische Innovationen betreffen 
hierbei auch die Diskussion um ein adäquat modifiziertes Hitch-Sweezy Oligopol-Modell. 
Darüber hinaus werden differenzierte zweistufige Tarife untersucht, und zwar als idealer 
Ansatz zur Wohlfahrtsmaximierung sowohl in Großhandels- wie Endkundenmärkten. Der 
Analysefortschritt wird den geltenden Regulierungsansätzen in der EU und den USA 
gegenübergestellt. Die EU hat relativ komplexe Regulierungsansätze entwickelt, wobei die 
Verbindung von Rahmenregulierung und nationaler Regulierung relativ kompliziert ist. 
Die Internationalisierung der Telekommunikation verlangt insgesamt nach einer 
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1.  Introduction 
At the beginning of the 21
st century, OECD countries have increasingly been shaped by 
information and communication technology (ICT). The share of ICT in total value roughly 
doubled in the 1990s and had achieved about 10% of gross domestic product in the US and 
Germany at the end of that decade. Telecommunications is one crucial sub-sector of ICT. It 
is characterized by high technological progress and a rise in the overall market in the 
context of technological convergence and digitization.  
Since the 1990s, information and communication technology (ICT) has been a major 
driver of economic growth in OECD countries. There is a broad consensus in the literature 
that ICT production - mainly due to high rates of process innovations - is contributing to 
growth. Moreover, there is also some evidence that the use of ICT contributes to long-term 
output growth (WELFENS, 2002; AUDRETSCH/WELFENS, 2002 BARFIELD/ 
HEIDUK/WELFENS, 2003). Digital services have also increasingly become 
internationally traded. Relatively falling prices in international telecommunications amount 
to reduced international transaction costs which in turn stimulate trade in general and trade 
in digital products and services in particular. Due to a high rate of technological progress, 
one may anticipate a continual fall in relative prices of ICT goods – such equipment is a 
key element for telecommunications – and hence an ongoing decline in 
telecommunications services. Since software is becoming increasingly important relative to 
hardware, one may furthermore assume that there is increasing long term scope for 
software-based standardization and product differentiation. Standardization facilitates 
exploiting economies of scale and network effects; flexible product differentiation should 
help generate higher average revenues of digital services in end-product markets.  
Telecommunications is a key element of ICT, and telecommunications regulatory 
issues have been important in OECD countries for many years. The EU has made progress 
in telecommunications through the rapid growth of rather unregulated mobile 
telecommunications (with regulation mainly referring to the licensing process). 
WELFENS/PONDER (2003) and EITO (2005) have shown that Eastern European 
countries have considerably caught up in the field of telecommunications. VAN 
ARK/PIATKOWSKI (2004) have presented evidence that ICT has also contributed to 
economic caching-up in EU Accession countries. 
In OECD countries, digital Services expanded in the late 1990s for three main reasons: 
•  Digitization blurred traditional market demarcations 
•  Expansion of broadband networks created huge new markets for digital 
communication 
•  Governments in Europe – and partly in Asia – opened up markets for competition, 
thus following developments in the US and the UK in 1984. 
The traditional approach, which considers telecommunications to be a natural monopoly, 
was given up in both the US and Europe in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. However, 
the telecommunications sector has to some extent remained a special sector which seems to 
justify regulation and has sector-specific competition rules.    2 
Regulation can put a strategic focus alternatively:  
•  on the service markets; this focus is typically chosen when infrastructure 
competition seems too difficult to achieve, that is, if there are hardly any domestic 
or foreign newcomers expected and if the incumbent enjoys very strong market 
dominance; 
•  infrastructure competition; emphasizing infrastructure-based competition puts the 
focus on incentives for adequate investment of competing network operators and 
for incentives for the resale of capacities 
Traditionally, there have been three arguments for government to intervene in 
telecommunications markets: 
•  Natural monopoly – which no longer is an argument in general, however, 
technological arguments still play a particular role; 
•  Need for interconnection rules which reflects a kind of externality of network 
operation on the side of each network operator; this is partly related to the topic of 
network effects which stands for endogenous growth and are mainly linked to 
certain services (not networks as such) 
•  Universal services which reflect the desire of society/the political system that all 
citizens should have access to important services at affordable costs. Due to 
technological developments, voice telephony and value-added services cannot be 
separated in a meaningful way and access to the internet has become at least as 
important in modern societies as voice telephony; a new concept of universal 
services is needed. 
The main aim of regulation is static and dynamic efficiency in telecommunications, in 
particular in digital services. From a pro-competition policy perspective, it is necessary to 
achieve: 
•  sustained competition in telecommunications; 
•  not to impose a technological bias or distort the innovation process; 
•  to particularly maintain an open and competitive access, as the access market is a 
kind of intermediate input for all digital services;  
•  effective international policy cooperation in order to make sure the competition in 
international telephony is holding. 
As regards effective competition, there are four potential impediments: 
•  traditional market barriers to entry which typically are related to high sunk costs 
(R&D and marketing expenditures are the main aspects here); 
•  bundling strategies of the incumbent operator which typically tries to shift market 
power from market i to market j; 
•  barriers for foreign investors which could serve as a powerful element in potential 
competition; 
•  impediments for resale which should play a certain role as long as at least two full 
competing networks still do not exist.   3
Given the dynamics of telecommunications markets in OECD countries and NICs, it is 
quite important to achieve sustained competition through a consistent mix of general 
competition policy and regulatory policy – the latter involving ex-ante remedies (e.g., price 
caps). Economic opening up of fixed-line telecommunications in the EU and other 
countries has brought major changes, including falling prices and a wave of innovations 
which are partly linked with mobile telecommunication dynamics. After 1998, network 
operators in the EU have cut back on R&D expenditures relative to sales, however, 
equipment firms have stepped up R&D activities. The implication of this structural shift in 
R&D activities is that barriers to entry in the telecommunications markets have reduced to 
some extent. The rather new phenomenon of bundling contributed to higher barriers to 
entry at the beginning of the 21
st century. It is rather difficult to decide whether the 
incumbent’s offering of certain bundles (e.g., call packages and internet flat rate) are a 
normal bundling phenomenon which should have been expected in a competitive 
framework or anti-competitive bundling launched by a firm with significant market power. 
A key challenge for the regulator is vertical integration on the side of the incumbent 
operator. Newcomers in downstream markets could face discrimination in the intermediate 
input market so that the competition process grows distorted. In a more general 
perspective, there is the issue of whether regulation can be confined in a consistent manner 
to a few bottlenecks so that the burden of regulation is rather small. From the perspective 
of general competition law, one should ideally limit regulatory intervention in such a way 
as to allow efficiency goals to be achieved at low costs. Regulating intermediate input 
markets – including the access market with its high barriers to entry – should normally 
suffice for creating sustained competition. At the same time, one should be well aware that 
simply hoping that the dominant operator/a firm with significant market power will offer 
contracts to competitors who are efficiency-enhancing and contribute to Pareto-optimal 
solutions would be naïve. 
From an economist’s perspective interested in sustained competition, one should not 
impose regulations without clear reasons. The EU which has imposed a broad regulatory 
framework – and holds a double veto power (with respect to market definition and market 
analysis as provided in the notification by the national regulatory authorities) – requires a 
triple cumulative test: 
•  There must be considerable sustaining barriers to entry; 
•  there is no inherent tendency in the market to achieve effective competition within 
a relevant time horizon 
•  general competition law is not sufficient to provide an adequate remedy for the 
problems to be anticipated. 
There is, however, no common degree of regulation across EU countries. Even if one 
takes into account that initial conditions differ across countries, it is rather surprising to see 
that the ECTA Regulatory Scorecard (a study sponsored by OFCOM) shows large 
differences across EU countries, the leading countries being the UK, Denmark and France. 
Poland, Greece and Germany are positioned at the bottom of the rankings. ECTA has 
argued that there is a positive correlation between the scorecard results and the level of 
investment in the telecommunications sector.   4 
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Source: ECTA (2005), Regulatory Scoreboard. 
 
To some extent, foreign direct investment should contribute to a narrowing of the scores 
across countries. There is certainly some regulatory arbitrage across EU countries, at the 
same time one cannot overlook that large EU countries – representing relatively important 
markets – still enjoy considerable policy autonomy. Whether a stricter EU regulatory 
framework would be useful is doubtful since it is unclear whether or not the EU will 
pursue a rational policy approach which would enhance static and dynamic efficiency. It is 
quite interesting to notice that there is a clear positive correlation between the scorecard 
results and investment in the telecommunications sector (ECTA, 2005). As this sector is 
part of the ICT sector with its high technological dynamics, low investment growth in the 
telecommunications sector is likely to undermine overall economic growth. From a 
theoretical and empirical point, there are also other arguments which point to a particular 
relevance of the telecommunications sector in a digitally-networked economy. For 
facilities-based competition, this is obviously crucial. 
The standard literature on regulations of fixed-line telecommunications has emphasized 
the high technology dynamics in the digital sector and that asymmetric price regulation and 
price caps are adequate policy strategies. Moreover the first stage of economic opening up 
requires a rather strict regulation of the incumbent operator (see e.g. BEESLY/ 
LITTLECHILD, 1989; WELFENS/YARROW, 1996; WELFENS/GRAACK, 1996; 
VOGELSANG, 1998; BUNTE/WELFENS, 2002; WELFENS/ZOCHE/JUNGMITTAG et 
al. 2005). After an initial stage of market opening up – in the EU with options for pre-
selection in national and international calls as well as opportunities for newcomers to rent 
lines from the incumbent operator – the situation has changed in the early 21
st century. 
Newcomers have gained market shares, and mutual invasion of markets through foreign 
investors has taken place; in part of the EU there seems to be oligopolistic 
interdependence. Mobile telephony has started to play an increasing role in the EU and   5
also in the US. The expansion of the internet and the increasing availability of broadband 
raise new issues. Innovation dynamics are strong both in the telecommunications network 
equipment sector, in the market for telecommunications equipment (particularly in the 
mobile market) and in the digital services markets. 
Among the thorny regulatory policy problems is the relationship between general 
competition law and regulations. Only a consistent framework at the national level will 
optimally stimulate static and dynamic efficiency. OFTEL/OFCOM has enjoyed both 
regulatory powers (ex ante interventions) and a role in the broader field of competition 
policy which mainly is ex post intervention. In Canada, the Competition Bureau and the 
Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) have 
concluded an Interface Agreement in 1999 specifying those areas where each authority has 
jurisdiction and fields of joint responsibility. Similarly, there was an agreement – the Co-
operation Protocol – between OPTA, the regulator in the Netherlands and the Dutch 
competition authority (OECD, 2006). The revised EU Framework Directives, which 
emphasizes market analysis (basically for 18 markets) before implementing regulations, 
requires that member states ensure that “this analysis (market analysis) is carried out, 
where appropriate, in collaboration with the national competition authorities”. As regards 
the US, authorities avoid potential conflicts associated with overlapping jurisdiction over 
competition issues. The FCC has concurrent authority with the Department of Justice to 
enforce section 7 of the Clayton Act with respect to telecommunications common carriers. 
Moreover, as regards mergers the FCC does not need to rely on the Clayton Act Section 7, 
rather it can rely on its more general “public interest” authority to review transfers of 
licenses or authorizations subject to regulations of FCC. In merger cases, consistent 
decisions require cooperation between the FCC and antitrust agencies which can be 
difficult in the case that confidential information available to the latter cannot easily be 
shared with the FCC (a waiver often helps here). There is no formal cooperation agreement 
between the FCC and the DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission, where informal 
cooperation seems to work. The FCC also often refers to merger guidelines jointly 
developed by the Federal Trade Commission and the DOJ for standard principles on issues 
as market definition and measurement of concentration. However, one may pose the 
question as to whether in an increasingly internationalized digital market and with rapid 
growth of VOIP/internet-based telephony, will there be a global telecommunications 
market in which it might become difficult to distinguish between EU market and US 
markets. Enforcement in the internet world is difficult. 
In the following analysis, we first present a theoretical analysis (section 2) which 
includes new ideas on optimum two-part tariffs and the role of a Hitch-Sweezy-type model 
for the telecommunications market. In section 3, we take a closer look at EU regulations 
(plus some US developments) and contrast the EU regulatory framework with our 
theoretical reflections. Section 4 offers some basic policy conclusions with particular 
relevance for OECD countries. 
   6 
2.  Theoretical Analysis of Telecommunications Markets and 
Regulation 
2.1.  Background 
Telecommunication markets consist of various elements and layers which create in an open 
economy a complex setting for the regulator; telecommunications markets – narrowly 
defined – are closely linked with dynamic services markets, in particular the internet 
market. Both falling prices of international telecommunications and a faster internet (read: 
broadband access) can help to stimulate international trade. As regards the internet 
FREUND/WEINHOLD (2002) have shown in their empirical analysis that increasing 
internet density contributes to growing trade. WELFENS/JUNGMITTAG (2002) have 
shown, in the case of the EU, that trade in goods and services in the EU is positively 
influenced by the intensity of international telecommunications.  
Besides important links between trade and telecommunications/the use of the internet – 
with causation possibly running in both directions- an international perspective is 
warranted in the context of foreign direct investment in telecommunications and the 
internet service provider business. 
In the US there have been only a few entrants from the EU, Canada and Japan. As 
regards the internationalization of the telecommunications sector the process of market 
consolidation in the EU is still incomplete. To the extent that former incumbents would 
like to merge there are often thorny issues of competition policy so that cross-country 
mergers of that type are a rare exception (TELIA-SONERA as a Swedish-Finnish merger 
is such a case).  
Barriers for international mergers and acquisitions in the fixed-line telecommunications 
sector can be expected to fall in the long run, namely for two reasons: 
•  As newcomers gradually gain market shares in many EU countries the effective 
restrictions on international mergers in Europe will decline; 
•  The growing market share of mobile telecommunications in the overall 
telecommunications sector and tendencies for mobile phone services to substitute 
for fixed line telecommunications (thus the old paradigm, according to which 
mobile telephony is complementary to fixed line telephony) implies a medium 
term erosion of the effective market share of incumbent operators in most EU 
countries. This holds because market share in mobile telephony typically are more 
equally distributed than in fixed line telephony. 
With international telecommunications mergers in the EU expected to increase one may 
also expect a rising internationalization of digital services. The digital entertainment sector 
thus could become much more internationalized than at the end of the 20
th century. 
In the internet business there are three different pillars of revenue for the service 
provider: 
•  access to the internet; this market clearly is interwoven with the 
telecommunications and cable TV market – regulatory policies matter (e.g. role of   7
bitstream access which is different across EU countries due to different national 
regulatory policies and different structures of the communications network – see 
for example the strong competitive role of cable TV in the Netherlands and the UK 
vs. the weak role of cable TV in Germany and Italy);  
•  paid services; the market for paid services is almost global, however, there are 
language barriers and sometimes technical access barriers (the latter mostly in 
countries with an authoritarian regime) which prevent full internationalization. 
Internet providers in principle can provide TV services;  
•  portal revenues generated through advertising. EU firms and US firms in the 
advertising business – originally coming from the print and TV media - dominate 
the global advertising markets. 
Within the EU, digital services trade and internationalization respectively are seriously 
hampered through artificially high access costs in some countries. This concerns, in 
particular, countries which do not have bitstream access (unbundled internet DSL access) 
and where broadband markets are not fully competitive. Germany is a country which 
suffers from both deficiencies. 
The EU regulatory framework effectively consists of several directives which are 
supposed to bring about sustained competition and broad access to e-communication as 
emphasized in the directive on universal services. National regulatory authorities (NRAs) 
have considerable autonomy in the regulation of telecommunications and the structure of 
the telecommunications sector is different in the EU countries. Countries with a broadly 
available cable TV network – offering internet services, telephony etc. – have rather strong 
competition, including the internet markets. Fixed-mobile convergence also is an important 
trend: Mobile operators offer special discounts for a home zone so that the mobile phone 
effectively is becoming a substitute for the fixed line access.  
There is a strong overlap of cable TV and fixed-line telecommunications as well as 
mobile telecommunications (and there is a natural competition between satellite TV and 
cable TV which is not covered here). In mobile telecommunications there is regulation 
only in two key areas in EU countries: licensing on the one hand, termination fees on the 
other hand – the latter does not hold for Germany. From a theoretical perspective the 
regulation of termination fees is only one option to avoid monopoly pricing problems in 
mobile telecommunications. An alternative provision would be variable pre-selection 
which would offer receiving customers a choice through which mobile operators they 
would like to receive their calls; this model effectively would mean pre-selected mobile 
termination. 
A growing share of digital services provided through broadband is related to internet 
providers. For internet providers access to high speed networks is crucial. Here vertical 
integration on the side of the incumbent operator can cause conflicts. If the incumbent has 
a dominant market position and wants to exclusively provide high speed services to 
customers this raises the question about undiscriminatory access. Taking a look at US 
developments and EU developments in 2004/05 it is not clear that one can easily find a 
consistent regulatory answer for this challenge – considering the transatlantic regulatory 
dialogue is seems that one might not find a common approach on both sides of the atlantic. 
Whether or not the OECD is a policy forum developing guidelines on digital access of   8 
internet providers remains to be seen. As regards internet providers interested in launching 
innovative services there is a natural interest to obtain bitstream access and to offer a range 
of various services packages which might include VOIP telephony whose expansion could 
cause accelerated depreciation on the side of the incumbent fixed-line operator; the stock 
market price also could come under pressure. 
Strong competition in EU markets – after opening up in 1998 and a wave of 
international investment which often reflected a mutual invasion of neighbor markets 
through former national monopoly operators – has strongly reduced national and 
international telecommunications prices. The liberalization of markets worldwide has 
eroded the role of the International Telecommunications Union which traditionally has set 
accounting and settlement rates, that is, organized the revenue split between outgoing 
traffic countries and inbound traffic countries. With asymmetric liberalization in the 1980s 
and early 1990s it was the US which had the highest sectoral current account deficit in 
telecommunications services since relatively high prices abroad implied a bias for 
international calls to originate in the US. 
A relative fall of international telecommunications prices will stimulate 
internationalization of digital services as will strong competition in local access markets, in 
particular in DSL and other broadband segments; cheaper local access facilitates the 
expansion of internet service providers. The internet plays a key role in the World Summit 
on the Information Society (WSIS) which is long run project under the auspices of ITU.   9
Figure 2: Regulation of Telecommunications and Digital Services 
 































































































Certainly, in all EU countries there is long term digital growth. Moreover, international 
outsourcing takes place – partly reflecting digital outsourcing -, rising trade in ICT goods 
is observed and e-government has become prolific. There are considerable differences   10 
among EU countries/OECD countries, respectively. This is partly related to two basic 
problems: 
•  the fact that (following the arguments of ARROW) information markets are 
systematically imperfect as those who want to sell digital information have to 
reveal part of the information for free. This implies that national information 
markets as well as international information markets typically suffer from market 
imperfections related to the fact that the effective demand – as perceived by the 
supply side – is below the demand level reflecting the marginal social benefit. This 
also implies that the national excess demand in any potential import market for 
information is lower than in a normal market and hence international trade in 
information is below the optimum level.  
•  Part of the information and knowledge market suffers from the fact that the 
respective products are “experience goods” or “confidence goods” where potential 
users find it quite difficult to indicate the value of the respective goods. Hence 
there is a market for lemons problem in part of digital markets.  
While it is well known that in markets with experience goods or confidence goods building 
reputation on the side of sellers and certain signaling mechanisms can minimize market 
failure, the real digital world is not always characterized by efficient strategies of firms. 
International telecommunications firms and internet service providers also face the 
problem that they encounter rather different regulatory approaches in the various OECD 
countries. 
Prices in liberalized OECD markets have fallen and there is evidence that the price 
elasticity of telecommunications services is above unity (OECD, 2005) so that sustained 
competition in combination with a high growth rate of technological progress should bring 
considerable volume growth in telecommunications. The EU has liberalized 
telecommunication markets in 1998 only when most countries in continental Europe relied 
on state-owned operators in fixed-line telecommunications. If prices in 
telecommunications are falling quickly after market opening-up this is likely to reflect 
three different elements: switching from monopoly prices towards a more competitive 
price pattern; reducing X-inefficiencies at the incumbent operator; technological progress 




2.2.  Theoretical Starting Points 
The starting point of theoretical analysis in telecommunications is that we face a natural 
monopoly in the telecommunications market: Marginal costs k’ and average costs k are 
falling. This problem is relevant for fixed line telecommunications, for cable TV and – less 
than in fixed line telecommunications – in mobile telecommunications. In combination 
with network effects this implies a serious regulatory challenge as there is a large 
discrepancy between a hypothetical monopoly outcome and the economic optimum which 
is characterized by the intersection point of the marginal costs curve and the marginal 
revenue curve. If government would pay a subsidy covering the gap between marginal   11
costs and average costs the implication is that there will be a higher tax rate (e.g. income 
tax) which in turn will distort economic allocation. Even worse, paying – an economically 
reasonable - subsidy to the telecommunications sector will stimulate calls for subsidizing 
other sectors which indirectly reinforces the arguments against paying subsidies at all. 
Instead a regulatory authority could try to impose a pricing regime which amounts to allow 
firms recovering average costs.  
In fixed-line telecommunications most OECD countries, except for Finland (and a few 
other cases), have a dominant incumbent firm which potentially is associated with various 
issues. Potential problems associated with the existence of a dominant position concern: 
•  Refusal to deal: this is related to the essential facilities doctrine: an essential 
facility is a facility supplied on a monopoly basis which is required by competitors 
and cannot be reasonably duplicated by competitors for economic or technical 
reasons. This problem of a monopolistic bottleneck is often crucial; 
•  Predatory pricing: the (dominant) operator charges prices below a normal cost 
standard and there is evidence that this is not sporadic or reactive price-cutting. 
This strategy aims to keep newcomers at bay; 
•  Cross subsidization: the dominant firm uses revenues from a market in which it is 
dominant to cross-subsidize the price of a service or product it provides in other 
markets – thus impairing competitors and keeping out newcomers; in some case 
the threat of predatory pricing will suffice to keep newcomers out of the market; 
•  Tied sales/bundling: Service 1 sold only if service 2, 3,...n are also bought – this is 
anti-competitive if firm has a dominant position in one of these markets. The 
dominant position is thus effectively transferred to other markets; 
•  Excessive pricing: the price is above the level under competition so that there is a 
monopolistic element in pricing. 
As many former monopoly operators enjoy a market share above 50 percent in fixed 
line telecommunications the potential problems associated with dominance have to be 
studied carefully by the regulator. 
The problem of market dominance in telecommunications is serious to the extent that 
there is a natural monopoly in fixed-line telecommunications. Indeed, there are economies 
of scale and economies of density in part of the fixed-line network operation which imply 
falling average costs (AC) and falling marginal costs k’ (or MC). From an economic 
perspective it would be optimal to realize point E that output where marginal cost is equal 
to marginal benefit. However, this will require a subsidy since average costs exceed 
marginal costs by the distance EF. The overall subsidy would be equal to the area FEp0H. 
One of the many problems associated with subsidization is that other industries will also 
call for subsidization. Moreover, every subsidy has welfare costs through the necessary 
financing and raising of taxes, respectively. Fixing output in accordance with the 
intersection of the average costs curve and the demand curve would be a second-best 
optimum which indeed, might come very close to an optimum – subsidization is avoided. 
If part of telecommunications is a natural monopoly – the access market could indeed stand 
for such a situation in many countries – it is clear that there will be the problem of a 
dominant operator or even a monopoly. Regulatory interference is necessary in this case.   12 


















Telecommunications is more complex than other industries not least due to the existence of 
network effects: The existing early users of a certain service will enjoy higher benefits if 
other consumers/firms are also linked to the network and also use the respective service. 
Such network effects imply an endogenous growth of sectoral demand (for an economist 
this looks similar – but only similar! - to the case of positive external effects on the 
demand side; in such a case the social benefits exceed private benefits so that the relevant 
demand curve is farther to the right than individual willingness to pay indicates). It is 
unclear whether telecommunication firms can fully anticipate network effects; correct 
anticipation would be crucial for adequate investment planning. Assuming that network 
effects show up as an outward rotation of the demand curve we can portray an initial 
demand curve DD0 (without network effects) and the dynamic demand curve DD1 which 
includes network effects.    13




















The demand curve DD1 is drawn in such a way that the initial demand curve DD0 coincides 
with the marginal revenue curve (R’1) for DD1. We can immediately see that there is a 
large discrepancy between monopoly pricing on the basis of DD0 and the optimum solution 
in point F or the second-best solution in point H. The existence of network effects implies 
that it is useful to have several suppliers, ideally in an oligopolistic setting with 
considerable interdependence among firms. For example, with several firms active in the 
mobile telecommunications market the spreading of new services has been very fast since 
each major operator wants to be a leader in product innovations while making sure that 
novel services can also be transmitted to other mobile operators, or to fixed-line network 
users. 
Network effects are also crucial when it comes to process innovation. Take the simple 
case of constant marginal costs, process innovations imply a downward shift of the k’ 
curve. With network effects there is an additional increase in consumer welfare. Therefore, 
it is crucial that the regulatory framework stimulates process innovations. 
Another problem related to the telecommunications market and market power, 
respectively, concerns the interdependence between the access market and services 
markets – e.g., the long distance market. Typically, the demand curve in the access market 
is rather steep. The long distance market is relatively price elastic and it is characterized by 
network effects so that AH is the relevant demand curve; not DL0 which is the static short 
term demand curve (without network effects). In the presence of network effects in the 
services market it pays off for an integrated network operator to subsidize access and 
hence, to charge only PA0 while average fixed costs is KF. Cross subsidization can be 
realized if firms can charge PL0 in the long distance market which is higher than average 
costs in the long distance market (KL). Without network effects the quantity in equilibrium 
(in line with the simple original demand curve DL0) would be Q0, but due to network   14 
effects (see DL1) – partly mobilized through subsidization of access – it will be Q1. The 
combination Q1 in the long distance market with q0 in the access market generates (as 
E’A’B’F’=FBCG) a net welfare gain of the triangle A’B’C’ plus the area ABH where the 
latter is the network effect in the long distance market. This analysis then raises the 
question whether a cost-oriented pricing in the access market – as imposed by the regulator 
– is really welfare-maximizing. 
Figure 5: Access Market and Long-Distance Market: Cross-Subsidization 
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Many OECD countries have adopted price regulations, typically in the context of an 
asymmetric regulation strategy. Regulatory pricing rules imply, however, three types of 
costs: 
•  Regulatory costs in the sense of bureaucratic costs at the regulatory agency. 
•  Cross-regulatory costs in non-regulated sectors where firms – normally used to 
only anticipate market actors’ behavior on the basis of the general competition 
framework – will have to consider some of the regulatory problems to the extent 
that the respective firms are using services provided in regulated industries as an 
input or are offering services which are complementary or a substitute to the 
services of the regulated sector. 
•  Regulatory costs on the side of the regulated firms; the regulated firm will not only 
hire experts for a regulatory policy division – rather it also will face a certain 
degree of regulatory uncertainty which will translate into higher prices at the final 
product level provided that the management of the vertically integrated firm is 
risk-averse. Regulatory uncertainty implies an upward shift of the cost curve. 
Regulatory uncertainty raises the final product price and increased regulatory 
uncertainty will translate into a higher final product price. The paradox situation 
could occur that the regulator will admonish the dominant operator for raising final 
product prices – allegedly because of exploiting significant market power – while 
in reality rising regulatory uncertainty is the true problem.   15
While a certain degree of policy autonomy is needed on the side of the regulatory agency, 
the degree of autonomy should be limited in order to achieve an efficient and effective 
regulatory regime; both government and the regulator should be aware of the problem of 
shadow regulations, these are informal regulations  and are difficult to detect; 
•  Thus government would be wise to limit the autonomy of the regulator in order to 
avoid the problem of “shadow regulations” which many regulatory authorities in 
OECD countries observe (shadow regulations mean e.g. threats to introduce new 
regulations if certain types of behavior on the side of the incumbent continue). If 
shadow regulations affect the access market they will contribute to a general rise of 
telecommunications prices – see the model in the appendix; 
•  The regulator would be wise to pursue a consistent and transparent policy which 
facilitates anticipation of the regulatory policies and remedies applied. 
It would be desirable to minimize regulations and to use a regulatory regime which is 
consistent and welfare-maximizing. We will argue that there basically two different 





2.3.  International Analytical Framework for Monopoly Problems and 
Competition 
The analysis of competition problems in the standard literature basically refers to the 
analysis of a monopoly in a closed economy. This, however, is not the reality of 
telecommunications markets in OECD countries. Particularly in the EU we find the case of 
asymmetrical international competition in the sense that the incumbent in most EU 
countries enjoys significant market power in the home country while foreign subsidiaries 
set up after the 1998 opening up of EU15 markets often are relatively small players in the 
market. One may argue that the subsequent analytical framework proposed is relevant not 
only for the EU but for other regional integration schemes (NAFTA, ASEAN etc.) as well. 
An adequate analytical perspective is a two-country framework with several operators 
– some of which are foreign investors. With two-way foreign direct investment (and trade 
in digital services), the problem of significant market power looks different than in the 
standard national policy approach of EU countries. Typically, each EU country has a focus 
on its respective national market, and the regulatory authority determines the relevant 
market and conducts basic market analysis – thus looking at the issue of significant market 
power – in order to finally decide upon adequate remedies. This approach, however, is not 
adequate, and it is surprising that the European Commission which is used to taking a 
broader view of policy topics has also implicitly adopted a kind a nationally-fragmented 
regulatory approach.  
What is the key issue here? Let us take a closer look at a simplified two-country setup. 
The typical situation considered here is one in which the incumbent firm F1 in country I   16 
enjoys a significant market power on the basis of a purely national market perspective. We 
will assume that the firm has a subsidiary f1 in country II. Economists and policy makers 
are interested in effective competition on the ground that only in the presence of such 
competition can one expect static plus dynamic efficiency (static efficiency requires that 
the firm’s offer price is based on long run costs while dynamic efficiency emphasizes the 
firm’s ability to come up with process innovations – translating in falling prices in the 
medium term – and product innovations which initially are associated with a rising relative 
price. Product innovations create Schumpeterian rents and allow firms to temporarily fetch 
prices above long run costs). We can distinguish cases for which there is strong 
competition in both countries, a monopoly in country I and II (the subsidiary f1 then is the 
only supplier abroad) or strong competition in only one of the two countries considered. 
Table 1: Basic Alternative Scenarios in a Two Country Model with Foreign Direct 
Investment 
  COUNTRY I   COUNTRY II 
Relevant Market 
Environment from 
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The policy approach in EU countries – and the EU competition framework – basically 
ignores the phenomenon of foreign direct investment and thus the degree of competition in 
foreign markets. Assume that there is a monopoly position in country I but competition in 
country II. Compared to the alternative scenario of a monopoly in both countries, one may 
expect that the subsidiary f1 will be exposed to competition dynamics and thus will be 
subject to a continuous learning and diffusion plus innovation process; the experiences 
made and insights obtained will feed into the parent company. This could include 
international diffusion of product innovations and process innovations (including 
improvements in corporate governance). If government and the regulatory authority in 
country I are interested in static and dynamic efficiency, they will not ignore the 
international activities of the incumbent operator, in particular if it occurs in other OECD 
countries. If FDI were mainly in developing countries, the case would be different as 
international diffusion would dominantly occur in the form of technology flows from   17
country I to country II/firm F1 to f1. In the presence of FDI, the regulatory authority will 
also enjoy opportunities to observe which demands the foreign subsidiaries is making on 
the dominant operator abroad with respect to interconnection, co-location, etc. If both 
countries are structurally comparable and regulatory regimes similar, the regulatory 
authority in country I will be able to draw important conclusions about the consistency of 
behavior of the multinational telecommunications (integrated) network operator. The 
parent company in country I should not be surprised if competitors come up with similar 
demands as f1 in country II. 
If FDI abroad reinforces product innovation dynamics in country I, there will be an 
intensification of competition, namely towards monopolistic competition. Thus one may 
argue that the original monopoly power of the incumbent in country I has been weakened. 
This would be true all the more if the incumbent operator in country II also invests in 
country I. Finally, there would be a reinforcing of pressure for optimum governance and 
innovation dynamics in country I if there were a credible potential takeover threat from 
abroad. To the extent that two incumbent operators in neighboring countries – with each 
incumbent enjoying significant market power in the national market – clearly will not be 
allowed to engage in an international merger, there is a negative international externality of 
having an initial situation with such symmetrical market power problems. Again by 
implication, we conclude that introducing effective competition in country I or country II 
or in both countries should affect the analysis of the problem of market power. A pure 
national policy perspective is inappropriate. 
It seems to be most natural to expect that the European Commission would adopt such 
a broader view on competition. One should also assume that the Commission would not be 
indifferent to a development where a multinational telecommunications operator loses 
significant market power (or a monopoly position) in country I while moving from 
competition towards a monopoly position in country II. The EU is, however, likely to 
ignore this if such a monopolization process occurs outside the EU unless it would impair 
international trade so that the WTO becomes involved. Such a broader policy view is also 
adequate in the presence of international network effects and in the case of static or 
dynamic scale economies. An isolationist national policy perspective would overlook key 
aspects relevant to the competition process. Finally, with the expansion of internet 
telephony (VOIP) the national demarcations in competition policy also will become largely 





2.4.  Efficiency in Oligopolistic Markets 
In several OECD countries liberalized telecommunications markets effectively are 
characterized by an oligopoly or the tendency towards an oligopoly. There are all kinds of 
models for various types of firms’ strategies in oligopolistic markets so that there seems to 
be broad uncertainty about the implications for regulations. However, the typical oligopoly 
observed in the first decade(s) after liberalization is one in which the incumbent is the clear   18 
price leader. Assuming asymmetric behavior of newcomers in the sense that newcomers 
will reduce the price if the incumbent is reducing the price while newcomers do not follow 
when there is a rise of the incumbent’s offer price we have an interesting case of the 
HITCH-SWEEZY model, in a setup with falling marginal and average costs (WELFENS, 
2004). 
The assumptions of the HITCH-SWEEZY model – assuming a given number of firms - 
are rather specific and only empirical analysis can tell whether the reality in fixed-line 
telephony indeed is represented by the assumed type of asymmetric behavior – a variant of 
“follow-the-leader” strategy. In the model there is an asymmetrical interdependency under 
oligopoly as there is one dominant firm and many relatively small competitors: If there is 
price reduction of the dominant supplier 1 the other firms will follow, which makes part of 
the effective demand curve less price elastic (steeper than a normal demand curve); the 
arch below the current equilibrium price is rather inelastic. If firm 1 raises the price other 
firms will, by assumption, not follow so that the effective demand curve is more elastic 
above point B: see the segment BA‘. If the oligopoly is facing less competition through 
substitute products – e.g. as a consequence of bundling of products in the market – the 
demand curve becomes steeper above point B: see segment BA; temporary pricing 
according to marginal costs implies a reduced quantity in this situation with a more 
pronounced price leadership (compare point F’ and F). If the situation is a stable oligopoly 
with clear leadership there is not a big difference between the hypothetical optimum 
defined by equality of marginal costs and the demand curve and pricing based on average 
costs (point B and equilibrium quantity q0 versus optimum output q1 and point E, 
respectively). The problem of a dominant market position – and hence the situation of a 
leading leader - is likely to emerge in an oligopoly in which one firm has a clear lead in the 
market share. The existence of network effects would not really alter the argumentation, 
only the equilibrium point is moving from E (or B) to E’. The key aspect in a Hitch-
Sweezy model with falling marginal and average costs is that the difference between the 
optimum allocation q1 and q0 is rather small; and given the costs of regulations one might 
then indeed consider only relatively limited regulation at all as long as the asymmetric 
oligopoly is persistent. The situation is more complex if one considers vertical integration 
which potentially raises problem of cross-subsidization and discriminatory access on the 
side of competing service providers. Moreover, a modified dynamic Hitch-Sweezy will 
have to take into account the problem of market entry and market exit explicitly; market 
exit would increase the ability of the incumbent to raise the price: This corresponds to an 
initial demand curve A’BC which then is replaced by ABC (the arch AB is steeper than 
A’B). Market entry of a firm conversely implies that we move from an initial demand 
curve ABD to a new curve such as A’BC. To the extent that market entry brings a 
downward shift of the costs curve we may consider the initial k’ curve to be the new k 
curve so that the initial equilibrium, point B, is replaced by point E (note that the kink in 
the demand curve then would also move into E).   19








































In the case of dynamic limit pricing we have a situation in which one dominant operator 
acts as an undisputed leader and is fixing the price in a way that it minimizes the incentive 
for newcomers to enter the market. A simple approach (see the GASKINS-type model in 
WELFENS, 2005) shows that under certain conditions the price is lowered by ½ of the 
quantity offered by newcomers. Thus, we can conclude that newcomers help to reduce the 
price charged by the industry leader to a level below the monopoly price, but at the same 




2.5.  Achieving an Optimum through Differentiated Two-part Tariffs  
Two-part tariffs are rather common in network industries. However, to date there is no 
clear theoretical model. The following reflections present a brief argument not just in favor 
of two-part tariffs but of differentiated two-part tariffs which could be highly relevant for 
regulators in telecommunications.  Indeed, one could argue that uniform regulated prices at 
the wholesale level or in the access market are not Pareto-efficient, rather differentiated 
two-part tariffs are required. If the dominant operator is not offering differentiated two-part 
tariffs the regulator should impose a provision which enforces broadly differentiated two-
part tariffs. The following arguments should make clear the logic behind this approach.   20 
Two part tariffs are used in many sectors of the economy, in particular in network 
industries where high fixed costs are important. The firm can recover costs more easily if it 
does not offer a uniform price but a two part tariff which is composed of an access fee and 
the option for the user to buy a certain quantity at marginal costs. If the marginal costs are 
constant the arrangement almost looks like a uniform price except that it is composed of 
two elements, of which one is the access fee and the other the uniform price. KNIEPS 
(1998) has argued that such a two part tariff is welfare enhancing. We will refine the 
argument in a broad way and argue that differentiated two part tariffs will bring enormous 
welfare gains. At first we will take a look at the simple two part tariff, namely for the case 
of two users with demand DDI and DDII respectively. This corresponds to the case of 
KNIPES (1998). Aggregate demand is given by the curve DDI+II. For simplicity, marginal 
costs k’ are assumed to be constant, k’0 . Moreover, it is assumed that fixed costs are given 
by the area PTUN. The firm basically could adopt alternative price strategies as follows: 
•  (i) standard monopoly pricing 
•  (ii) full price differentiation 
•  (iii) cost-oriented uniform price setting 
•  (iv) two-part tariff setting 
•  (v) differentiated two part tariff setting 
We will show that the latter case is welfare maximizing. We will ignore here standard 
monopoly pricing and full price differentiation. First taking a look at cost-oriented uniform 
price setting, we can see that a uniform price p – with p being equal to OP – implies for 
users I and II that the quantities q
I and q
II are realized. If the firm instead announces that it 
will offer a two part tariff where paying the access price PTUN (designed to recover fixed 
costs) allows the user to obtain his/her desired quantity at marginal costs, the user I – with 
the relatively small demand – will renounce this offer and rather consuming at price OP=p 
the quantity qI. Clearly, the access price PTUN exceeds PQSN.  
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The high volume user II will, however, prefer the two-part tariff so that he/she will have a 
demand equal to q
V, which exceeds q
II, the overall demand thus increasing to q
X. The 
welfare gain from switching to the two part tariff is given by the triangle TVU.  
We now can go beyond the traditional approach. It can be argued that differentiated 
access cards/access prices are welfare maximizing. The firm offers individual access cards 
to every user. For the user I the adequate access price is PQRN – demand of user I will be 
equal to the distance NS. Offering indeed two different access cards thus raises the 
equilibrium demand by the distance RS. User II gets an access card at the price QTUR. 
With the differentiated access card, we now have a further rise in the equilibrium quantity 
which now is equal to q
Z. The welfare gain from switching to a differentiated two part 
tariff is the triangle QRS plus the area PQRN.  
We immediately recognize that the standard procedure by certain regulatory authorities 
of imposing uniform access charges is not welfare-maximizing. Instead differentiated two-
part tariffs are welfare maximizing (also at the wholesale level). They achieve the same 
goal as Ramsey pricing, but in a different way. In our approach it is not the regulator which 
has to estimate cross price elasticity’s, as in the case of Ramsey pricing. Rather the 
regulator would stipulate that users are entitled to individual entry cards on the basis of an 
efficient provision of services. Here this means that the regulated firm should not be 
allowed to inflate its fixed costs, thereby reducing marginal user prices artificially. The 
regulator only needs knowledge about the cost structure of the regulated firm; and the 
welfare gain from switching to a differentiated two-part tariff can be high (see appendix). 
An important implication is that equal access requirement cannot simply be translated into 
equal prices for all network users; in the special sense of a differentiated two-part-tariff 
discounts should be allowed. 
As regards welfare analysis in regulatory policy one should emphasize that a 
comprehensive analysis should consider: 
•  Welfare analysis in the sense of consumer surplus for households in the 
telecommunications services sector. 
•  Welfare analysis in the sense of taking into account the producers surplus both in 
the domestic economy and in foreign countries – the latter to the extent that the 
domestic regulatory framework affects the ability of multinational 
telecommunications firms to be successful foreign investors abroad (from a pure 
national policymaker’s perspective one normally will ignore the producers surplus 
in the home market which accrues to foreign subsidiaries in the country; in the EU 
context, however, the European Commission in its regulatory policy should 
consider overall EU25 welfare analysis). 
•  Welfare analysis should take into not only the direct impact in the 
telecommunications services market but also the important direct effects which 
occur through telecommunications services used as intermediate inputs in all 
sectors of the economy: E.g. a fall of telecommunications services prices will 
translate into lower costs of production and hence higher volumes sold of all 
products using telecommunications services. As the volume of telecommunications 
services for business customers in OECD is higher than services sold directly to 
households one should indeed not overlook this aspect. A similar reasoning applies   22 
to product innovations supported by innovative digital services inputs (upward 
rotation of the demand curve). 
Finally, with international network effects in telecommunications the traditional view of 
national policymakers also becomes less convincing. The stronger foreign direct 
investment is in telecommunications and the more relevant international network effects 





3.  Regulatory Developments 
3.1.  Regulatory Developments in the US  
US Approach and EU Approach to Regulation 
The US regulatory policy has been modified after the 1996 Telecommunications Act. It 
mainly is based on the following elements (STOCKDALE, 2003): prohibition on the 
provision of competitive services, structural safeguards (e.g. the incumbent monopolist has 
to provide competitive services through a structurally separate subsidiary), equal access 
requirements (e.g. the incumbent LECs has to provide to all long-distance network 
operators exchange access and related services on an unbundled tariff basis and on non-
discriminatory rates terms and conditions) and other safeguards. 
The Telecommunications Act is the basis for regulation and consists of several key 
elements which differ from the EU approach (OPTA, 2005): 
•  Access regulation is based on access to unbundled network elements (UNEs) while 
the EU approach puts more emphasis on wholesale services; 
•  supply obligations are imposed on operators which have a broadly dominant 
position, while the EU framework of 2003 puts emphasis on significant market 
dominance in – 18 pre-defined – markets; 
•  the US approach brings obligations to supply a particular unbundled network 
element or several such elements only if this is considered to be a pre-requisite for 
competition. 
In the late 1990s the US approach basically emphasized services competition, while 
infrastructure-based competition was adopted after the collapse of the New Economy 
bubble in 2000/01: 
•  the FCC has at first emphasized in many cases that incumbent local exchange 
carriers (ILECs) should offer local unbundling and offer resale. The FCC has 
required that ILECs offer UNE-P (consisting of use of both the access network and 
the facility of the local switch run by the ILEC) so that by early 2005 about 10% of 
the 180 million exchange lines in the US were organized within UNE-P rules;   23
•  the FCC has favoured line sharing so that competitors (CLECs) could use against a 
modest rental fee the high frequency part of the local loop for broadband access 
while the ILEC was continuing provision of voice telephony over the remaining 
low frequency part of the loop. 
The FCC has shifted emphasis in its approach in the Triennial Review Order of 2003 and 
now focuses more on infrastructure-based competition, as fixed line network operators 
argued that cable TV operators were the leading suppliers of broadband services in the 
residential sector and had no UNE-obligations – and indeed the FCC rules state at the 
beginning of the 21
st century: 
•  no requirements to supply UNE-P arrangements and no requirements for ILECs to 
supply unbundled elements from its fiber to the home or fiber to the curb facilities; 
•  when replacing copper loop access network with fiber ILECs have no requirement 
to maintain existing rented local loops or offer substitute products to competitors; 
•  as regards ILECs they are obliged to give their competitors access to all except the 
largest office blocks, but there is no obligation to offer dark fiber or interconnect 
links. 
The basic aim of this new strategy is to stimulate investment in new broadband 
infrastructure in the US. It obviously is in this context that the FCC has abolished 
broadband fixed-line regulation in 2005.  
In Canada facilities-based entrants into the long distance market were allowed in late 
1992 and in 1997 the regulator CRTC opened local telecommunications market to 
competition - incumbents were required to interconnect with newcomers and to provide 
essential services for resale. Leasing of unbundled network elements also was introduced, 
namely at estimated costs +25% mark up. CRANDALL (2005) argues that the relatively 
slow liberalization in Canada helped to avoid the stock market frenzy which characterized 




3.2.  Regulatory Developments in Europe 
The regulatory debate in Europe is influenced mainly by several main policy actors: The 
European Commission clearly is an active player at the supranational level; among the 
NRAs there are several players which are rather active and influential – obviously with a 
certain lead by the British OFCOM. The latter has a relatively long experience in 
regulation dating back to 1984; this implies that competition has developed to a rather 
broad extent while the general EU opening up of markets only dates back to 1998. EU 
eastern enlargement brought 10 additional countries in the Community as of May 1, 2005; 
and all accession countries are dominated by mobile telecommunications which has 
become a popular substitute to the long-neglected fixed-line network. 
In the UK, OFCOM – in the consultation document of November 25, 2004 - has 
adopted an approach which puts emphasis on infrastructure and less on the regulation of   24 
markets. OFCOM considers, with respect to next generation networks, four principles and 
emphasizes that BT should give access to bottlenecks: 
•  promoting competition at the deepest possible level within the infrastructure 
network; 
•  emphasizing regulation in a way which brings equality of access to facilities and 
services which are suffering from insufficient competition (equivalence approach); 
•  eliminating regulations where competition is working; 
•  encouraging efficient and timely investment; 
•  the incumbent operator BT should provide access to competitors where bottlenecks 
are relevant.  
While OFCOM is rather influential in the EU one cannot overlook that the situation 
across EU countries differ considerably. It is absolutely unclear how one can have a single 
integrated EU telecommunications market with very different national regulatory 
approaches; this critical perspective holds particularly for the mobile market. OFCOM also 
has been rather active in organizing a secondary market for mobile licenses.  
In Germany the revised telecommunications act emphasizes reducing regulatory 
intervention but also gives the Federal Network Agency (FNA) some competences for ex-
post regulation which is in contrast to the very idea that regulation normally is restricted to 
ex ante rulings while competition policy puts the emphasis on ex post analysis of market 
dynamics – except, of course, in the field of mergers & acquisitions. 
The EU framework competition gives a broad guideline, however, individual EU 
countries have high degrees of freedom in implementing the EU framework. Efficient 
regulation of telecommunications/e-communications is not only important in the context of 
competition policy but also in a broader context of EU policy. 
The Lisbon Agenda set by the Commission and the European Council has aimed at 
stimulating growth and employment on the one hand, on the other hand the EU wants to 
become the most competitive knowledge-based economy by 2010; the mid-term KOK-
report has come out with a very sober assessment according to which the Lisbon Agenda is 
overloaded and most goals are rather uncertain to be achieved in the coming years; 
researchers also have found that the EU has fallen back behind the US in ICT to some 
extent (DENIS/McMORROW/RÖGER/VEUGELERS, 2005). Moreover, the EU is facing 
a serious decline in political legitimacy as the failed referenda on the EU constitution in 
France and the Netherlands – there with a shocking no-majority of almost 2/3 of the 
population – have shown in 2005. 
The EU has adopted a regulatory framework, composed of 5 directives, which was 
expected to be translated into national law by 2003. A long term goal is to move to general 
competition law. There is an International Regulatory Group/European Regulatory Group 
(IRG; ERG) in which national regulators cooperate. In the EU the NRAs have considerable 
autonomy but must submit reports to the Commission in which they notify evaluations on 
18 pre-defined relevant markets. Moreover, the Commission’s guidelines on significant 
market power also play an important role. The new EU regulatory framework stipulates 
that new telecommunications markets should not be subject to unnecessary regulatory   25
burden; the idea is to stimulate the expansion of innovative services. This is likely to be 
conflict-prone in the field of internet access and broadband services, respectively. 
Competitors will require continued access to DSL network elements of the incumbent 
operator. The incumbent is, however, likely to roll out VDSL and argue that the shift to 
VDSL creates new markets which should be unregulated. 
The Aim of the EU directives (Frameworks Directive, Authorization Directive, Access 
Directive, Universal Service Directive, Directive on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications) is to establish an EU-wide framework for regulations of 
telecommunications in a way which encourages static and dynamic efficiency while 
making sure that a minimum of generally available services at uniform low prices is 
available in each EU member country. The basic aim is to maximize social welfare (sum of 
consumer rent and producer rent) under the side-constraint of universal service provision. 
While universal services in telecommunications have traditionally referred to universal 
access to voice telephony at uniform rates within a country, the phenomenon of digital 
convergence and the rapid growth of mobile telephony have changed the universal services 
perspectives. Moreover, the increasing use and usefulness of the Internet implies that 
broadband local access will be important for a dynamic digital social market economy. 
The Commission Recommendations on relevant markets are complementary to the 
above directives and suggest 18 markets as candidates for ex-ante regulation – national 
regulatory authorities (NRAs) have to conduct market analysis within this framework 
(Article 16 of the Framework Directive). While the rather unregulated mobile 
telecommunications markets in sales terms have gradually become more important than 
fixed-line telephony in Western Europe at the beginning of the 21
st century and have 
dominated fixed line markets in most accession countries since the mid-1990s, the fixed 
line telecommunications market has continued to be regulated in EU countries. EU fixed 
line telecommunications markets have been increasingly characterized by mutual entrance 
of incumbent operators so that former national monopoly operators have become 
multinational companies eager to export and import digital services as well as launching 
product innovations at home and abroad. Within an approach of asymmetric regulation the 
incumbent operator has been regulated; national regulatory authorities have adjusted and 
slightly liberalized the regulatory regime in most EU countries. However, regulatory 
authorities have hardly recognized the challenge of foreign direct investment which 
requires a more complex welfare analysis; e.g. there are foreign investors operating in the 
fixed-line market – effectively this could refer to traditional copper cable or cable TV – 
this means part of the producer rent in the telecommunications services will accrue to 
foreign investors. From a national regulatory perspective/economic policy perspective one 
will ignore the effects of national policy measures and regulatory remedies on producer 
rent accruing to foreigners. However, from an EU perspective such an approach is 
inadequate; at least should one distinguish between intra-foreign investment and EU-
outsiders. From a Community perspective the perspective on policy measures is naturally 
this: One should clearly consider not only national welfare but also welfare effects in other 
EU member states. Moreover, the broader approach to competition policy in OECD 
countries also lets one expect that a certain consideration also should be applied to welfare 
effects in EU no-member countries. From this perspective regulatory impact assessment 
clearly should not be confined to simply taking into account national welfare effects, rather   26 
the ongoing dynamics of foreign direct investment in the EU and the OECD, respectively, 
require the adoption a broader and more refined approach. A broader approach which 
includes some international welfare effects is not easily achieved in an n-country 
Community as long as each member country has specific national policy goals and 
regulatory approaches. At the same time it also is clear that a variety of policy approaches 
can be quite useful for an evolutionary learning process in the Community. Moreover, the 
EU 25 countries are much too different in terms of size of the economy, per capita income, 
population density etc., that one could simply consider a uniform regulatory approach. 
A strength of the framework is that it has established a uniform framework which helps 
policymakers to adopt approaches which across countries are not too diverse and thus 
facilitate formation of expectations on the side of investors. Moreover, it has forced 
regulators to cooperate to some extent in the EU. The weakness of the framework is that it 
does not allow low income countries which are catching up to have, transitory, an extra 
degree of freedom in regulation. While it is true that one may blame the insufficient 
freedom given to transition economies on the lack of desire of accession countries to get 
permission for transition regimes in the negotiations with the Commission on EU 
accession, one also could argue that the Commission should consider an extra degree of 
freedom in accession countries as a natural desire on the side of the overall Community. 
The aim is to fully exploit the medium term economic benefits from the modernization of 
the telecommunications sector in relatively poor countries. Given limited EU structural 
funds it should be quite obvious that transition countries might need some extra room for 
maneuver in order to stimulate investment in infrastructure which is so clearly behind the 
level of EU15 countries. Another weakness is that the EU does not specify a clear-cut 
criterion whose fulfilment allows national regulations in certain fields to be abolished. E.g. 
if there is nationwide sustained competition in fixed line telecommunications – see the case 
of the Netherlands where cable TV is a full-fledged alternative to the fixed line network – 
why should ex ante regulations be maintained at all? Rather, general competition law 
should then become relevant which not only would mean a shift towards broader use of 
general rules (as opposed to sector-specific regulations) but also imply a major reduction 
of policy costs and of costs for the regulated firms. A particular weakness is the failure to 
generally encourage long term facilities based investment in general and more foreign 
direct investment in particular; intra-EU foreign direct investment is a natural element of 
the EU single market. 
The framework has achieved its objectives in the sense that all national regulatory 
authorities are carefully observing the EU framework and have become willing to 
cooperate with regulatory authorities in other EU countries. The framework has reinforced 
competition in telecommunications in the EU, it also has helped to encourage NRAs to 
more carefully look into economic analysis as a useful basis for the pros and cons of 
alternative regulatory approaches. 
In the Netherlands the national regulator OPTA has emphasized not only the distinction 
between regulation of services vs. regulation of infrastructure. As regards services one 
additionally may distinguish between established and emerging markets (OPTA, 2005). As 
regards infrastructure one may additionally (OPTA, 2005, p.5) make a distinction between 
legacy infrastructure based on past investment - and established technologies – and new 
infrastructure which requires additional new investment and which is exposed to   27
considerable demand and/or innovation uncertainties. OPTA obviously does not want to 
regulate emerging markets and also is reluctant to interfere in fields where considerable 
new investment is to be expected. 
Germany has a relatively independent regulator and has made considerable progress 
with competition so that many newcomers have entered the market. A disaster has been 
telecommunications where the incumbent telecommunications operator was allowed for 
several years to maintain its cable TV network until it sold the majority ownership in cable 
TV. However, the cable TV network is still hardly used for modern digital services such as 
internet and telecommunications since the layers of the network are split in a strange way – 
the end user level is in the hands of thousands of small and medium-sized firms so that the 
cable TV is not really important for competition in telecommunications; this holds despite 
its broad coverage (2/3 of households could be reached, about 1/3 is using it). This 
situation is in sharp contrast to the Netherlands where government forced the incumbent 
telecommunications operator to sell the cable TV network so that there is full 
infrastructure-based competition in the Netherlands; and therefore only very limited need 
to regulated the digital markets. Broadband uptake was strong in Germany in a rather short 
period, but broadband access is mainly through fixed line telecommunications where about 
90% of DSL subscribers were customers of the incumbent (EITO, 2005, p. 116). The 
growth rate of broadband subscribers in the EU15 was much higher than in Germany in 
2003. Lack of local loop unbundling in the DSL market is one of the key problems. 
In Germany the Federal Network Agency (FNA: responsible for telecommunications, 
railways, energy, postal services) has adopted an asymmetric regulatory approach and uses 
various price caps. A main regulatory issue which came up in late 2005 was the VDSL 
(very high bit rate digital subscriber line) network. The incumbent operator Deutsche 
Telekom had announced plans to invest around € 6 bill. over several years in a new VDSL 
network and had argued that this should be exempt from regulation. While the FNA 
initially was willing to grant an exemption from regulation, namely on the ground that this 
could concern a new market, the European Commission opposed this plan. The regulator 
has been rather reluctant to stimulate VOIP/Internet telephony. 
The percentage of subscribers using an alternative provider in the EU15 has increased 
over time. In mid-2004 it was close to 7% in the field of direct access, while in local calls 
it was 20% (up for 15.5% in mid-2002). The degree of effective competition in direct 
access in the EU certainly was higher than indicated by this figure if one would include 
mobile telecommunications users who have substituted fixed-line access through mobile 
telecommunications. Moreover, cable TV increasingly is becoming an alternative 
infrastructure for telecommunications and other services – with the Netherlands standing 
out in the EU. 
The percentage using alternative providers in long distance/international calls was 
31%. Obviously the access market still is the real problem in the EU15/EU25. For the 
growth of innovative broadband internet services this is a serious challenge. Foreign 
investors from non-EU countries are likely to face problems here. While the incumbent 
operator has a natural interest to earn Schumpeterian top-ups on investment in innovative 
infrastructure networks there also is an interest that expansion of innovative digital services 
not to be impaired by incumbent operators. From a EU25 perspective it is quite crucial to 
put regulatory policy also in a broader context of innovation and growth policies (the   28 
Lisbon Agenda). High wage economies such as Germany or France will witness relocation 
of manufacturing industry to eastern Europe and Asia, thus it would be all the more 
important that ICT services – representing relatively skilled-intensive sectors – will expand 
at high growth rates. A competitive Schumpeterian telecommunications environment also 
is a favorable breeding ground for a high innovation rate in the telecommunications 
equipment sector.  
Figure 8: The Role of Alternative Providers in Telecommunications in EU15  
 
Source: Briglauer 2006 
 
As regards international innovation dynamics it is clear that the emergence of fast 
broadband networks in OECD countries will accelerate the international diffusion of 
knowledge and new technologies on the one hand, on the other hand it also will facilitate 
an increase in international networking among researchers. So both the innovation process 
as such as the diffusion process will be intensified in a networked world economy. 
Moreover, there is an increasing scope for positive spillover effects from (national) 
innovations. To the extent that network effects play a role for many product innovations 
one also should point out that the opportunities for innovators to recover R&D costs are 
improving if the telecommunications regulatory arrangements in both countries – in the 
context of a two-country model – are such that sustained effective competition in network 
operation and in the provision of digital services is encouraged. In an n-country context 
with heterogeneous countries (in terms of human capital endowment and R&D capital 
intensities) one certainly would expect asymmetric international spillover effects of 
innovations whose positive impact on national income could trigger further 
interdependencies related to secondary-round effects via growth of trade and foreign direct 
investment flows. However, there is a particular challenge for innovation policy since 
international external effects of innovations – related to traditional positive spillovers or 
network effects – could undermine the willingness of government to invest in R&D:   29
International “innovation leakage effects” indeed imply that part of the benefit from 
government R&D support will accrue to firms abroad so that considerable growth effects 
and hence additional tax revenues are generated in foreign countries. This problem could 
be overcome through international cooperation among policymakers and R&D promotion 




4.  Conclusions 
The main conclusions concern the field of e-communication and the suitable strategies in 
regulation. If one wants to achieve sustained competition in telecommunications/e-
communication in the digital economy one should adopt a regulatory approach which 
emphasizes sustainability of competition. This implies that in the early stage of market 
opening up there is a relatively strong need for regulation, in particular in the access 
market. Governments eager to promote competition certainly should encourage investment 
in the cable TV sector – a problem which has been underestimated in many EU countries 
(in Germany the competition authorities paradoxically wanted to impose in 2004/05 
particular requirements on foreign investors eager to invest in the German cable TV which 
undermined foreign investment and indeed reinforced the dominant market position of the 
incumbent in the fixed network). While mobile telecommunications is rapidly expanding in 
eastern Europe and western Europe one should not assume that mobile telecommunications 
can be a full substitute for fixed line networks/cable TV networks: Indeed, as regards 
internet access it will take some time until mobile communications become a substitute for 
fixed line access – only for firms this could be a new option in the medium term. 
Regulation of digital markets is to some extent necessary, but unnecessary regulation 
should be avoided. We may state several clear conclusions: 
•  In the case that the telecommunications market effectively is characterized by an 
asymmetric oligopoly with a behavior as described in the HITCH-SWEEZY 
approach, one could consider not applying any price regulation at all (the benefit 
of regulation is most likely to outweigh the costs of regulation). Rules for 
interconnection would be the only major field of regulation in this case. As we 
understand market-opening up and regulation as a dynamic process one may 
emphasize that adequate regulation depends on the stage of market development 
and the structure of the market, respectively. 
•  Since it is unlikely that an asymmetric oligopoly is a stable market structure the 
regulatory authority should be maintained in any case as a critical watchdog of 
competition. However, in fields where regulation can be phased out it should be 
phased out. There is no reason for imposing regulation if general competition 
policy is sufficient to bring about effective competition. 
•  At the wholesale level and in end-product markets one carefully should consider 
strong incentives for differentiated two-part tariffs. If all major firms in the   30 
telecommunications sector agree to offer quite differentiated two-part tariffs, the 
regulatory authorities also have no incentive to intervene, except for the 
requirement of interconnection (incidentally, the principle of differentiated two-
part tariffs can usefully be applied in all infrastructure sectors). The EU framework 
for regulation and regulatory policy in many EU countries lacks theoretical 
underpinning and so far has neither adequately considered the oligopoly problems 
in fixed-line telecommunications nor the option of fostering differentiated two-part 
tariffs which would allow the minimization of regulations. Indeed, the proposal 
made here could be applied across OECD countries. As regards the ongoing 
internationalization, it would be useful to have a broader policy dialogue which 
should include theoretical background studies and policy benchmarking studies. 
Efficient regulation of telecommunications/e-communications is one of the most 
important challenges in the Digital Market Economy. In a pragmatic perspective 
one may state that the access market can be expected to remain the most difficult 
market from a regulatory policy perspective. At the same time it is clear that very 
large differences in regulatory efficiency – as found in the EU - should not be a 
sustainable phenomenon. The natural mechanism for a market-driven process 
towards regulatory convergence is foreign direct investment, including 
international M&As. The more competition there is in the market, the less 
restrictive cross-border M&As in telecommunications should be handled. In the 
long run, facility-based competition should be encouraged along with an efficient 
resale regime which partly could involve subsidiaries of the incumbent operator. 
Making the best use of existing network capacities and investment is really 
important when trying to maximize long run services use and to stimulate product 
and process innovations. A particular issue is the introduction of a newly-defined 
universal service in the EU. In a modern digital economy, one may indeed consider 
broadband universal services as a kind of basic digital service to which all citizens 
of the Community should have access at affordable rates. Universal services could 
be delivered at minimum costs if competitive bidding processes would be 
organized by governments so that the firms requiring the lowest subsidy would get 
the contracts. Positive external effects of the networked use of information and 
stimulation of innovations - with positive external effects - are a justification to 
indeed invest taxpayers’ money in the provision of broadband universal services.  
Among the many problems encountered in telecommunications markets, one should not 
overlook the special issue of secondary markets for mobile licenses. While the US has 
reduced the burden for mobile operators to sell an obtained license (unless it is a satellite 
license), the opportunities for selling licenses in EU countries are rather limited. Indeed, 
getting an UMTS license in many EU countries is associated with unclear/imperfect 
property rights of the licensee. This impairs the optimum exploitation of spectrum ruse. 
There is, however, the caveat that competition authorities must have the right to intervene 
in this market if there is a clear risk that selling a license will amount to creating a position 
with significant market power.  
If universal service is to be defined on the basis of broadband services one has to 
carefully analyze how an efficient universal service can be achieved. In regions with low 
population density government should allocate subsidies and indeed give a contract to that   31
firm which requires the lowest subsidy. To impose broadband universal service through 
regulation per se would distort competition as the largest firm probably would have to bear 
the highest burden in the sense of making high loss-making investment in regions with low 
population density. As competition makes cross-subsidization difficult an artificial 
upgrading of universal services through regulation would indeed encourage anti-
competitive behavior of some firms. High revenues from auctioning of licences could 
partly be used to finance subsidized universal services in low-density regions.  
In an increasingly networked digital world economy, one may anticipate considerable 
benefits from increased competition which should include positive effects from import 
competition and increasing foreign investment flows. There are considerable challenges in 
the field of international cooperation among regulators, in particular if telecommunications 
markets become global markets. Moreover, one should emphasize that there will also be 
new challenges for cooperation between R&D policymakers as growing digital networks 
imply more opportunities for international spillovers from both innovation and innovation 
policy. In countries with effective competition between alternative networks (e.g., fixed-
line network vs. cable TV network), the regulation of telecommunications can be much 
milder than in countries where facilities-based competition is rather weak and where one 
finds an incumbent with significant market power. It is clear that weak competition in 
network operation implies a considerable risk that the digital services market will also 
suffer from weak competition and insufficient Schumpeterian dynamics. As benefits for 
the consumer are not only related to end-user digital services but also indirectly to digital 
services, which are an input in the production of other goods and services, policymakers 
should indeed adopt a broader welfare economic perspective. With respect to the proposed 
principle of differentiated two-part tariffs, one should emphasize that the approach 
suggested is not only valid for infrastructure services (ranging from telecommunications to 
transport and energy) but also for other fields with high fixed costs – a particular field is 
R&D which always is characterized by high fixed costs.   32 
Appendix  1:  Welfare Gains from Introducing Differentiated 
Two-part Tariffs 
If we assume constant marginal costs, k’, we can easily calculate the welfare gain from a 
switch to a differentiated two part tariff. (One may also assume that average fixed cost 
F=k’(1+f’) where f’ is a parameter indicating the relative size of average fixed cost.) Let us 
consider the case of a demand function p=a-bq and marginal costs k’=f. The intersection 
point of the sum of the marginal costs and the average fixed cost curve with the demand 
curve is given by q# = (a-(f+F))/b. It is well known that the consumer rent (Ω) in the case 
of pricing in line with marginal costs f is given by Ω = (a/2)(a-f)
2/b. The increase in 
consumer rent associated with a switch from a uniform two part tariff to a differentiated 








The steeper the demand curve and the higher ‘a’ is, the higher the increase in consumer 
rent. The higher f is the higher the rise in consumer rent. A necessary and sufficient 
condition for a rise of consumer rent is the condition F(2-2f/a-F/a)>0. A rise in F will 
positively influence the rise in consumer rent, if F/a<2(1-f/a)<2.   
What is a pragmatic estimation of the increase in welfare from switching to two-part 
tariffs? A lower-bound estimate is to assume that the consumer welfare of low-volume 
users will double. In addition, if consumer welfare under full cost average pricing is evenly 
split between a few high volume users and the many low volume users, the increase in 
economic welfare is one-quarter the initial consumer welfare. If, alternatively, we assume 
that the welfare gain per low volume user is 2/3 of the revenue and if the revenue from low 
volume users is one-half of the market revenue, the increase in welfare gain would be 1/3 
of market revenue. As a pragmatic estimation of the potential benefits, one may assume 
that low volume users represent ½ of overall potential traffic. 
In many markets with considerable fixed costs of production, one finds an implicit 
differentiated two part tariff in the form of discounts which depend on staggered minimum 
sales. Typically, the relative discount is higher, the higher the sales are with the respective 
high volume customer. In reality, many markets indeed are characterized by bonus 
schemes for high volume users which to some extent could effectively reflect differentiated 
two-part tariffs. However, a true differentiated two part tariff has the advantage that both 
parties agree ex ante on which class of implicit discount will be given. Collecting all the 
relevant data from all customers will give the producer an almost perfect idea about 
required production capacities.    33
Appendix 2:  Modeling the Problem of Regulatory Uncertainty 
Let us consider a firm which is facing regulatory uncertainty in an intermediate product 
market where uncertainty is covered by the standard deviation of regulation (R). The firm 
considered is regulated in an intermediate product market only. The firm maximizes 
expected utility of profits, so that we have a profit function in which the expectation value 
(µ) of profit enters with a positive sign while the standard deviation (σ) of profits enters 
with a negative sign. Managers are risk-averse. Hence we have utility function U(µ, σ) 
where partial derivatives Uµ>0 und Uσ <0. 
The firm is producing in the end user market the amount q and will use intermediate 
products f(q) which are obtained at a regulated price which effectively consist of average 
costs c’ (as indicated by the firm in intermediate production) times a regulatory factor. This 
positive factor could be above unity at some point of time but temporarily also could be 
below unity if the regulator assumes that there is significant market power that has to be 
corrected or if the incumbent has to contribute to the universal services fund. 
The final product effectively is value-added involving labor and the intermediate 
product; the expectation value of profits is in the case of wage cost W (W is nominal wage 
is W, labor input is L) given by 
 
(I) µ = pq – WL(q) – E(R)c’f(q) 
 
(II) σ = c’f(q) σR 
 
(III) U(µ, σ) = U(pq – WL(q) – E(R)c’f(q), c’f(q) σR) 
 
What is the optimum quantity to be produced which relies on regulated intermediate 
inputs? Differentiating (III) and setting the first derivative equal to zero, namely dU/dq=0 
we get as the necessary condition for utility maximization: 
 
(IV) Uµ (p-WL q – E(R)c’f q) + Uσ c’fq σR =0 
 
(IV’) p = E(R)c’fq + WLq - (Uσ/Uµ)c’fq σR 
 
We can see from equation (IV’) that the offer price p in the final product market is he 
higher the higher the expected level of regulation is (parameter R) and that a rise of the 
standard deviation in regulation will lead to a rise of the final product price.  
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